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standing these problems, the country studies provide many new insights and a lot of
interesting information.
The second part ofthe study deals with the importance ofthe specific bargaining
institutionsin the Nordiccountries. Jackman analyses the role ofthehigh centralisation
ofwage bargainingas comparedto the effects ofthe ambitious employmentpolicies and
the systems for unemployment compensation. F/anagan, Ho/den, and Ho/rn/und and
Skedinger all consider the question how local wage increases (wage drift) are related to
central wage increases. Unfortunately, their results and the findings of the country
studies do not provide adefinite answer to the question whether wage drift and central
wage negotiations should be treated as separate processes thatjointlydetermine wages,
or whether central bargainers can indeed determine final wage outcomes. Particularly
the interesting approach by Flanagan suffers from anidentification problem because it
is very difficult to discriminate between the determinants ofwage drift and ofcentral
wage increases, which are likely to be affected by the same variables. This means that
the interrelation between wage drift andcentral wage increases warrants more research.
Finally, Pissarides and Moghadam compare relative-wage determination under cen-
tralised and decentralised bargaining conditions, but their approach proves to be theo-
retically and empirically unsatisfactory.
Although some ofthe papers in the second part ofthe book are not as convincing
as the country studies forming the first part, this volume is a valuable contribution to
the growing literature on union models and wage determination. It can be strongly
recommended to all students ofwage formation inside and outside the Nordic coun-
tries.
Claus Schnabel
Hallwood, C. Paul, Transaction Costs and Trade Between Multina-
tional Corporations. A Study ofOffshore Oil Production. World
Industry Studies, 9. Boston, London, Sydney, Wellington 1990. Unwin Hyman.
XVIII, 202 pp.
Yes, vertical integration in the oil industry still matters. As C. Paul Hallwood
demonstrates in his book, this old controversy is still alive andcalling for further work.
It matters in a time in which economists seem proud ofhaving rediscovered imperfect
competition in order to help explain the shifts in country and firm shares in the world
market experienced in the last decade. True, the profession's attitude toward monopoly
andcompetitionchanges over time. Afterhaving reached a peakinthe 1960s and 1970s,
the sympathy cycle for perfect competition is now heading for a deep trough since the
early 1980s; the line separating monopoly from competition seems to have shifted in
favour ofthe former.
The study by C. Paul Hallwood fits quite weIl into these current developments. It
is an enquiry into the organisation ofthe intemationalised offshore oil supply industry,
the industry which supplies intermediate inputs (goods and services) to the oll firms
engaged in the exploration for and the production ofhydrocarbons on a global scale.
In the past, research focused on the downstream activities ofoll firms, particularly on
transportation, refining and marketing ofpetroleum products. Hallwood's is the first
major attempt known to the reviewer to close this gap by looking at the upstream
segment ofthe industry.
An important part ofresearch carried out on the oil industry deals with the impact
ofvertical integration ofmajor oll companies on competition in each ofthe affected
(downstream) markets. In contrast, Hallwood finds and tries to explain the phe-
nomenon ofupstream disintegration cum competition in the oll industry. He explains
it recurring to a modified version of Ronald H. Coase's transaction cost argumentRezensionen - Book Reviews 817
concerned with the choice between alternative institutional arrangements for economic
activities. The relationship between the oil firms and the oil supply firms being one of
buyer and seller, Hallwood hypothesises that disintegration characterises the industry:
oil firms do not recur to inhouse production ofintermediate inputs; they buy most of
them (up to ninety per cent) in the market. Independent operation ofinput production
is justified by economies ofscale derived from a wider market (all the oil firms instead
of only one) and by transaction costs, the latter being preferred by the author as an
economic explanation. It is somewhat confusing that on the one hand the oil supply
firms are found by the author to be virtually unrelated to the oil firms and that on the
other he hypothesises (again recurring to the transaction cost argument) that what
prevails is quasi-vertical integration instead ofcomplete vertical disintegration. Fur-
thermore, while the scale economies argument in favour ofindependent operation of
the production ofoil supplies seems plausible, the transaction cost argument does not
offer a convincing explanation ofthe observed ownership pattern, which, as described
by Hallwood, does not include potential financiallinkages between firms on each side
ofthe market. An ongoingmulti-year research projectin which the reviewer is currently
participating yielded preliminary evidence ofa complicated financial relationship be-
tween the major oil firms and the major oil supply firms, involving direct and indirect
share holdings in bothways as well as interlocking directorates. Ifthis evidence should
survive further critical examination it could possibly support Hallwood's hypothesis of
quasi-vertical integration, though in a different sense. At the same time, it would
challenge Hallwood's finding that the upstream oil supply market is competitive and
thus strengthen the opinion that substantial barriers to entry exist in this market.
Hallwood himselfadds further reasons for anticompetitive behaviour by showing that
the market is highly concentrated on both sides and that innovation constitutes the
central force governing this "follow the customer" market. This means thatlittle ifany
scope at all is left for price competition among the few performance-oriented suppliers,
because innovation in a world of"idiosyncratic products" assumes close cooperation
between the buyer and the seller during much of the R& D process. Future research
(including that on financial linkages) will reveal what degree of vertical integration
characterises this industry best. Any outcome nearfull orquasi-vertical integration will
then have to be scrutinised from the point ofview ofUS antitrust law, as far as the US
market is concerned, and from the point ofview ofinternationallaw (EEC law, GATT
norms), as far as the world market is concerned.
Another interesting issue raised by the author is the public policy designed and
implemented by the governments of the relevant oil provinces to face the potential
impact of the internationalised oil supply industry on their domestic economies. The
British, French and Norwegian approaches are briefly reviewed together with the
policies of selected developing countries (Venezuela, Brazil and China). The general
conclusion is that with the exception ofthe U.K. protectionism prevails. Following the
infantindustry argument every country seeks to regulate the oil supply market in order
to increase the share ofdeliveries by domestic firms. The conclusion pertaining to the
U. K. is rather surprising as also is the author's opinion that the U. K. practices an
"open door policy". It is well known that in order to apply for an exploration and
production licence in the U. K., every consortium ofoil firms is expected to disclose to
the British authorities the source of the oil supplies needed to carry out the project.
Until recently, the U.K. government required the consortia to respect a domestic
content clause.1 Due to the fact that the leading multinational oil supply firms estab-
1 Foders, Federico, Rüdiger Wolfrum et al., Meereswirtschaft in Europa. Rechtliche
und ökonomische Rahmenbedingungen für deutsche Unternehmen. Kieler Studien,
223. Tübingen 1989.818 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
lished affiliates in the U.K. long ago, the dilemma faced by British regulators was to
find an appropriate definition of a British company. In spite ofsuch efforts, British
protectionism had a paradoxical outcome: while not a single British company was able
to penetrate the technological core ofthe international oil supply industry, the British
policy effectively shielded the major multinational oil supply firms active in the U.K.
from competition from third countries. This is also supported by Hallwood's survey of
the oil supply sector in Scotland.
The bookis divided into twelve chapters, the first two ofwhichintroduce the reader
to the transaction cost argument and to the fundamentals ofauctions. Chapter 3 takes
up the issue of vertical integration. Important features of the offshore oil supply
industry are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, and illustrated with the author's survey of
tbis sector ofthe British economy presented in Chapter6. The remaining chapters deal
with the particular customer-seller relationship observed in tbis market (Chapters 7 to
10) and with selected policy experiences at the country level (Chapter 11); Chapter 12
is a concise summary ofthe whole study.
The reader will notice that this rather smaIl-sized book ofsome 200 pages is over-
loaded and, thus, not easy to read. Less material and more clarity would have added
to the intrinsic value ofthe study. This notwithstanding, Hallwood's book remains the
first serious and comprehensive enquiry into the oil supply industry. It is a piece of
original research and a main contribution to the positive empirical analysis of the
industrial organisation ofmultinational firms. It can be highly recommended to stu-
dents and teachers as an exciting case study, and to researchers as a promising field for
further work.
Federico Foders
Helpman, Elbanan, Paul R. Krugman, Trade Policy and Market Structure.
Cambridge, Mass., London 1989. The MIT Press. XII, 191 pp.
This book is the normative sequel to the authors' Market Structure and Foreign
Trade, which dealt with positive trade theory (i.e., the basis and the gains from trade)
with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. In the monograph under
review the authors examine the policy implications ofimperfect competition. They do
this by summarizing the large literature and synthesizing the large number ofmodels
introducedduring the 1980s to examinetheeffects ofintroducingimperfectcompetition
and industrial organization theory into international trade.
After abrief overview introductory chapter, Helpman and Krugman review the
effect of tariffs and quotas in perfectly competitive markets in Chapter 2. Then the
authors examine the policy implications ofimperfect competition at horne and perfect
competition abroad (Chapter 3) and perfect competition at horne and imperfect com-
petition abroad (Chapter 4). These chapters are clear and weIl presented, and serve as
background and preparation for the more difficult analysis ofthe subsequent chapters.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the new roles oftariffs, quotas and subsidies under imper-
fectly competitivemarkets at horne orabroad. The authors begin by introducing simple
models and then add various complications and note the effect ofthese complications
on the results obtained. As contrasted to their earlier volume, the chosen level of
analysis in this volume is partial rather than general equilibrium. The unifying tools of
analysis used are the perceived marginal revenue ofthe firm and the ratio ofprice to
marginal cost as a measure ofmarket power.
In Chapters 5 and 6, Helpman and Krugman then turn to more complex cases of
imperfect competition bothat horne and abroad. In Chapter 5, they deal with strategic
export policy and in Chapter 6 with strategic import policy. The authors do this by